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Over 2 million foreign nationals currently reside in Japan legally, and the majority of them newcom-
ers. Although foreigner population is small compared to the total population in Japan, foreign residents 
have become an increasingly visible presence in Japanese social and economic life. How are these immi-
grants integrated into Japanese society? This paper, by examining the narratives and practices among im-
migrants in Japan, shows a complex picture. On the one hand, immigrants who have lived in Japan for a 
substantial period have demonstrated a high degree of cultural assimilation and social incorporation. On 
the other hand, Japan, despite its multicultural coexistence programs, has not made immigrants feel that 
they are “immigrants” of this country, let alone potential participants of its democratic political process. 
In their minds, Japanese society remains culturally unique and Japanese identity primordial and fixed. 
This does not mean that immigrants are frequently rejected or discriminated against in their daily life. 
What I have observed is that through both multicultural coexistence programs and immigrantsʼ own ef-
forts in assimilating, many immigrants have a high appreciation of Japanese society, and some form a 
sense of belonging to at least a segment of Japanese society. However, this appreciation and localized be-
longing do not translate into identification with Japan or develop into a true sense of political citizenship, 
their Japanese nationality notwithstanding.
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It was December 23, 2012, the Sunday after the national voting weekend. Japanʼs Liberal Democratic 
Party had just beaten Nodaʼs Democratic Party of Japan, and Abe once again became the Prime Minis-
ter. Inose Naoki was elected the new governor of Tokyo on December 18th. I walked into the parentʼs 
room of the weekend Chinese school. Knowing many parents there were naturalized citizens, I asked if 
they had voted the week before. I first asked Xiao who was married to Japanese. She said she didnʼt, 
because she didnʼt quite understand whom to vote for. Lisaʼs mother said that her whole family, her 
(Chinese) husband and her adult son, all got up late, so they decided not to go. Other people laughed, 
saying the voting was done all day. She chuckled, and said, “We have no idea whom to vote in any 
case.” The only person that voted was Qi, but she didnʼt know whom she voted for because “my (Japa-
nese) husband took my card and went to vote.” She said, “He did that for me every time. He was very 
conscientious. I canʼt care less.”
When everybody was expressing the consensus that they had no idea whom to vote, I suggested that 
we should probably see who would be good for immigrants like us in the long run. Pan retorted, “We 
should see what is good for Japan. When Japanese people are getting better oﬀ, foreigners will get bet-
ter oﬀ too (In Chinese: Riben ren hao le me, wai guo ren ye hao le me.)” I asked, “What if the condition 
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for the Japanese to have a better life is to deny the rights of the foreigners?” Pan said it would not be 
possible. Japan needed foreigners. I told them about the newly instituted foreigner residential card 
(gaikokujin zairyūkādo) and the purpose for doing that—to connect the computer system of Ministry 
of Justice and city governments in order to manage immigrants especially in the case of residential sta-
tus changes, so as to prevent visa abusers or undocumented migrants. Some women voiced approval 
(of the measure) and said it was good to regulate. Pan said of course Japan was trying to control. It was 
not an immigrant country, unlike America, and had no experience of immigration. It was learning to 
manage immigration.
The story above is from my field notes at a weekend Chinese language school. Shortly after this brief 
discussion that I deliberately initiated for my own research interest, the conversations among the 
mothers went back to the usual topics—juku (cram school), childrenʼs junior high school choices, and 
other education and childrearing related issues.
This little snapshot shows that, first of all, most Chinese immigrants at my field site had very little in-
terest in Japanese politics. Participating in political activities, in this case, voting, was not something 
high on their priority list. Second, despite the expanding population of foreign residents, Japan is still 
considered a non-immigrant country even by immigrants themselves. At least in the immigrantsʼ nar-
ratives, the Japanese and the foreigners were diﬀerent categories of people. Finally, the Chinese immi-
grants here seemed to be on the side of Japanese authority. They were more eager to conform to the 
Japanese social norms than to question them.1
As an immigrant myself, my immediate reaction toward their political indiﬀerence and conserva-
tism was disappointment. I was hoping to see a more active engagement in Japanʼs civic activities 
among this group of middle class and well-adapted immigrant parents. But I was not surprised. The 
lack of engagement of immigrants in host societyʼs political process has been documented in diﬀerent 
European and North American countries. Studies in the US show that first generation ethnic Asian 
migrants are less likely to vote (Cho et al. 1999, Lien 2004, Logan et al. 2012). Asakawa (2003)ʼs survey 
among naturalized immigrants in Japan shows that only three percent of them chose voting rights as a 
reason for applying for citizenship. Immigrants naturalized mostly for practical reasons such as secur-
ing their stay in Japan. On the other hand, it can be argued that their conservatism—the lack of inten-
tion to change Japan and to change the relationship between Japan and immigrants might itself signify 
their acculturation. These Chinese immigrants show a strong tendency to follow Japanese lifestyles and 
social norms. They fully embrace Japanese way of education, acting as typical middle class Japanese 
parents who send their children to various cram schools and care immensely about their education 
mobility. Moreover, these Chinese middle class immigrants identify strongly with the average Japanese 
position, believing in the importance of maintaining social order and regulating migration.
This paper, drawing on immigrantsʼ narratives and practices, attempts to understand such an appar-
1 As typical of the narratives among Chinese immigrants with secure legal statuses, the undocumented immigration or visa 
overstaying phenomenon in the Chinese community is considered a social stigma.
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ent nonchalance toward civic participation in the host polity yet at the same time a conformist attitude 
toward Japanese society. Although Japan provides specific institutional and social contexts that have 
shaped immigrantsʼ self-understanding of their positions in and relationship with the host society, 
some of the social psychological mechanisms indicated in the Japan case might not be so unique to Ja-
pan. Instead, they are characteristics of the immigrant-host society relationship in the modern world 
when ethno-national identity is repeatedly reinforced in both home and host societies and when trans-
national communications and travels are not only technically feasible but also practically necessary.
Citizenship and Political Incorporation: A Literature Review
With the globalized population movements and the expanding trend of transnational migration, 
both citizenship and belonging have become increasingly complex. There have been many discussions 
about a lack of political participation among the immigrants. Immigrants are either not interested in 
applying for citizenship or treat citizenship as instrumental for practical benefits (Ip et al. 1997, Asaka-
wa 2003). How to interpret immigrantsʼ lack of interest in gaining political membership and in civic 
participation in the host polity? Among research about issues around immigrantsʼ citizenship con-
sciousness and political incorporation, three types of discussion stand out. The first type of discussion 
centers on the diﬀerent notions of citizenship. Some scholars argue that the concept of citizenship is 
based on western political philosophy and a liberal democratic tradition, focusing more on individual 
rights and obligations (Ip et al. 1997). Many immigrants are from societies that embrace diﬀerent types 
of “citizenship”. For example, some Asian immigrants are from a tradition that center their commit-
ment and loyalty to families and communities (ibid). Many immigrants were also from countries that 
are not liberal democracies, and have had no chance to vote and to exercise the political rights of citi-
zenship. Instead, they had a form of passive citizenship (Turner 1990). Civic participation is therefore 
not a form of political culture familiar to them.
The second approach to the issue of immigrantsʼ weak citizenship consciousness focuses on the 
changing institutional framework of citizenship. Globalization and regional integration has fundamen-
tally changed the institution of citizenship. Citizenship and the rights associated with it are traditional-
ly tied to oneʼs membership in a nation-state. In recent decades, many scholars have pointed out that 
nation-states are no longer the sole conferrers of political and social rights associated with citizenship. 
Regional governance and the universal human rights regime have made many of these rights available 
to immigrants with or without national citizenship (Soysal 1994, Castle and Davidson 2000). The re-
gional integration in Europe and the increase of transnational mobility of people have given rise to su-
pranational citizenship (Soysal 1994), transnational citizenship (Bauböck 1995, Kivisto and Faist 2009) 
and even the notion of global citizenship (Folk 1993). Immigrants can obtain the civic, political and 
social rights—the traditional tripods of citizenship rights (Marshall 1950) from diﬀerent rights grant-
ing institutions. Increasingly, residency itself allows immigrants to access most civic and social rights 
and partial political rights. As a consequence, many immigrants are satisfied with a long term or per-
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manent resident status, feeling no incentives to become citizens of the host country. Denizens or qua-
si-citizens are all terms used to describe such tendencies. Chung (2010) shows that this is true in Japan 
as well. Except for voting and assuming government positions, permanent residents in Japan have as 
many rights as citizens.
The third types of discussion focus on the relationship between immigrants and the host as well as 
sending societies. The classic argument is that there are diﬃcult phases of assimilation, and that politi-
cal assimilation is realized after immigrants have been economically and culturally assimilated and of-
ten happens only to second and third generation immigrants (Gordon 1964). This is supported by 
some studies in the United States (e.g. Cho 1999, DeSipio 1996). However, the findings are not consis-
tent and some researchers point out that among some immigrant groups the third generation is less 
likely to vote than the second generation (Lien 2004). Aside from assimilation argument, studies have 
also tried to discover the eﬀects of socialization and migration contexts on civic participation (Logan 
et al. 2012).
Another type of research investigates immigrant identity and belonging. Research shows that even 
among immigrants who are naturalized, there is a decoupling between the political and legal aspects of 
citizenship—their understanding of the rights and to certain degree responsibilities in the host society, 
and the cultural and identificational aspects of citizenship—their emotional relationship with the host 
society (Soysal 2000, Gilbertson and Singer 2003, Brettel 2006). For example, Gilbertson and Singer 
(2003) observed a surge of naturalization among the Dominican immigrants in the US during the 
post-1996 welfare reform period. They find that immigrants sought naturalization in order to gain le-
gal protection for both their residency in the US and the benefits that were entitled to previously but 
were increasingly denied to them under welfare reform. In fact, they argue that for many Dominican 
immigrants, U.S. citizenship does not necessarily signify their intention for permanent settlement or 
incorporation in the U.S. If anything, U.S. citizenship functions to allow older immigrants to continue 
a pattern of transnational residence. They call such citizenship “protective citizenship” (p. 44). They 
quoted one Dominican immigrant saying “Iʼm not doing it (naturalizing) because I feel it in my heart 
(Gilbertson and Singer 2003, p. 44).”
Brettel (2006), on the other hand, reports that many naturalized immigrants in the US, at least in 
their narratives, do show their awareness of their civic responsibilities. She shows that the majority of 
immigrants, Vietnamese—Indian, Nigerians and Salvadorians, naturalized primarily for pragmatic 
reasons. American passport is a useful “paper”, securing rights such as spousal inheritance and em-
ployment opportunities. However, she observes that her respondentsʼ reasons for naturalization do not 
simply represent a defensive approach to legal changes. They do indicate a “sense of responsibility as 
well as of rights” (p. 96). Some immigrants mention they plan to exercise their rights to vote and even 
to send their children to military. She calls this kind of citizenship “pragmatic citizenship” because 
even if it does not translate into immigrantsʼ emotional attachment to the host society, it is beyond a 
narrow self-protective mentality. She argues that the reasoned approach to naturalization shows that 
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immigrants have demonstrated a form of “political belonging”. However, they are yet to show a sense 
of “cultural belonging”.
In Japan, Asakawa (2003) conducted a survey of several hundred naturalized citizens in the late 
1990s and inquired about their motivations for naturalization, their satisfaction and dissatisfaction re-
garding naturalization. The main reason is reported to be a realization that they are to stay in Japan 
and the citizenship secures their status. Moreover, in Japan, institutional discrimination persists in ar-
eas such as housing and labor market. Without Japanese nationality, immigrants are frequently denied 
access to rental properties and certain occupations. Some immigrants naturalized in order to remove 
those sorts of institutional barriers. In comparison to utilitarian responses, those who answered “gain-
ing voting rights” as the primary reason were only 3 percent of the sampled (Asakawa 2003).
Why are immigrants nonchalant toward political participation? How much sense of belonging is 
needed in order for immigrants to actively participate into the political process? These question might 
find some implicit answers in Ghassan Hage (2000)ʼs notion of passive versus governmental belong. In 
his analysis of the discourses of multiculturalism in Australia, Hage (2000) diﬀerentiates two formula-
tions of national belonging. One is that “I belong to the nation” and the other is “ʻThis is my nationʼ 
(i.e. ʻThe nation belongs to meʼ (p. 45). He argues that the former one implies a sense of passive be-
longing in the sense of being part of it, meaning “that he or she expects to have the right to benefit 
from the nationʼs resources, to ʻfit into itʼ or ʻfeel at homeʼ within it (p. 45).” The other mode of national 
belonging, what Hage calls governmental belonging, is “the belief that one has a right over the nation, 
involves the belief in oneʼs possession of the right to contribute (even if only by having a legitimate 
opinion with regard to the internal and external politics of the nation) to its management such that it 
remains ʻoneʼs homeʼ (Hage 2000, p. 46). Hage argues that only the latter form of belonging allows one 
to feel entitled to having a view about the government and management of the nation.
In a way, it is easy to see that what Brettel (2006) considers belonging at the political level is still a pas-
sive form of belonging. Immigrants are open to the responsibilities entailed from gaining the citizenship. 
Yet, only a true sense of identification with the nation can lead to active participation in the managing 
and governing of the state. So, in the case of Hageʼs Australia, the indignant whites who felt entitled to 
saying how the Australia society should be showed a governmental belonging, a belonging that can be 
translated into political voices. This paper follows this line of inquiry and tries to understand immi-
grantsʼ relationship with Japanese society and to find out how immigrantsʼ political attitude might be a 
manifestation of their relationship with Japanese society.
Data
This paper primarily draws on qualitative interview data I have collected between 2011 and 2013 
among first generation newcomer immigrants in Japan. The author and a team of Chinese, Korean and 
Filipino graduate students interviewed 130 first-generation immigrants. Among the interviewees, 80 
were Chinese; 40 were newcomer Koreans; and 10 were Filipinos. Interviewees were recruited through 
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research assistantsʼ own social networks. The basic criteria were the length of residency and residential 
status. We selected those who had stayed in Japan for at least 5 years and were not current students at 
the time of interview. The interviews were semi-structured in the sense that a multi-lingual interview 
guide with basic questions was given to the RAs before the interviews. These were all typical qualita-
tive interviews that last somewhere between one hour to 2 and a half hours. All interviews were fully 
recorded and transcribed. Table 1 presents these interviewsʼ demographic characteristics.
The interview data is supplemented with the authorʼs participant observation in a weekend Chinese 
language school for children where many middle-class Chinese parents regularly gathered.
Japanʼs New Immigrants: Profiles, Patterns of Migration and Incorporation
How immigrants enter Japan to a large extent conditions their relationship with the host society by 
determining their locations and the possible trajectories of mobility in Japanese society as well as pre-
scribing the possible patterns they can interact with the host society. Restrictive immigration policies 
in Japan mean that immigrants who are in Japan usually come with institutionalized channels and 
with well defined purposes. In this section, I provide a sketch of the profiles of the largest immigrant 
groups, and explain how the manners of their migration condition the patterns of incorporation pres-
ent among immigrants.
Immigrant Profiles
By the end of 2011, 2.07 million legal foreign residents registered in Japan, making up 1.63％ of the 
total population of 127.7 million people in Japan. Among these 2 million foreign residents, 54.5％ 
were women while 45.5％ were men (Ministry of Justice 2012).2 Chinese, Koreans, Filipinos, Brazilians 
and Peruvians were the top five nationalities (Figure 1).3 Although Koreans were numbered at about 
545 thousand, 70 per cent of them were in the category of Special permanent residency, meaning Zain-
ichi Koreans, those who entered Japan before and during WWII and who had lived in Japan for at least 
two generations. The newcomers Koreans were only about 160,000. There are also many naturalized 
immigrants in Japan. In the decade between 2003 and 2012, over 140 thousand immigrants obtained 
2 http://www.moj.go.jp/nyuukokukanri/kouhou/nyuukokukanri04_00021.html
3 In 2012, the Filipino migrants surpassed the Brazilians to become the third largest foreign resident group.
Table 1.　Demographic profiles and residential statuses of the interviewees
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the Japanese citizenship. Among them, Koreans were over 82,000, and the Chinese were 43 thousand.4 
While the majority of the naturalized Koreans were third or fourth generation Zainichi, almost all nat-
uralized Chinese were newcomers.5
Migration Patterns and Migrant Characteristics
For the Japanese government, students and skilled migrants are the most desirable migrants.6 As a 
result, most of the Koreans and Chinese new immigrants in Japan are former students, skilled workers, 
and their spouses. Some Chinese and Koreans are marriage migrants who entered Japan as spouses to 
Japanese nationals. In comparison, most Filipinos entered as Japanese spouses and entertainers.7 Being 
entertainers was once the most common migration channel for the Filipinos. Before Ministry of Jus-
tice imposed strict regulation on this visa category, there were years when tens of thousands of Filipino 
women entered as entertainers (Douglas 2000, Oishi 2005). Many of them later on married Japanese 
nationals and became spouses. Table 2 shows the residential categories the newcomer Chinese, 
Koreans and Filipinos occupied in 2011.
The newcomer immigrants are predominantly women. As Table 3 shows, women outnumber men 
4 ＂過去 10 年間の帰化許可申請者数，帰化許可者数等の推移，＂ Ministry of Justice, URL: http://www.moj.go.jp/MINJI/toukei_
t_minj03.html, accessed on April, 20th, 2013.
5 In the six year from 2006 to 2011, the number of Special Permanent Residents among the Koreans, the category for Zainichi 
Koreans, reduced by nearly 54,000. During the same period, 44,450 Koreans became Japanese citizens. Some of the reduction 
of Zainichi residents might be due to deaths, but the others were naturalized. This stronger naturalization tendency is reported 
in studies about Zainichi Koreans (e.g. Chung 2010).
6 Even though “trainees” are the most numerous new entry cohort every year, this visa category is equivalent to guest worker 
and is not conversable. Therefore trainees have to leave Japan upon the expiration of the contract and have very little opportu-
nity to eventually settle in Japan.
7 In 2011, the largest entry category for both Chinese and Koreans were students. The largest category for the Filipinos was 
spouses of Japanese nationals. See ＂国籍別　新規入国外国人の在留資格，＂URL: http://www.e-stat.go.jp/SG1/estat/List.
do?lid=000001089430, accessed on April 20th, 2013.
Figure 1.　Major nationalities of registered foreign residents in Japan (1985‒2011) 
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significantly among the Chinese and the Filipinos. Nearly two thirds of Chinese residents in Japan are 
women and over three quarters of Filipinos are women (Table 3). Given that the majority of the mar-
riage migrants are women,8 it is not too farfetched to expect that the overall female presence among 
the new immigrants is much higher. Comparing to the Chinese and the Filipinos, Koreans seem to 
have a more balanced gender ratio but women were still 55 percent of the total. However, Korean new-
comers are only 30 percent of the Korean population in Japan, so it is not clear how the gender ratio is 
among the newcomers.
Social Incorporation and Cultural Assimilation
Due to the restrictive migration channels, upon landing in Japan, the new immigrants usually enter 
Japanese institutions immediately, as students, skilled employees or spouses, mostly wives. Their sta-
tuses prescribe that they need to orient themselves in a new cultural and social environment and adapt 
to it as soon as possible. Although immigrants face diﬀerent kinds of diﬃculty in Japan, most of them 
eventually learn the rope and become competent in their new environment.
The Chinese and Korean have the relative advantage of cultural aﬃnity with Japan, at least in terms 
of language. The Chinese easily recognize many Chinese characters in written Japanese which provide 
8  平成 18 年度「婚姻に関する統計」の概況 http://www.mhlw.go.jp/toukei/saikin/hw/jinkou/tokusyu/konin06/konin06-3.html
Table 2.　 The major residency categories of Chinese, Filipino and Korean newcomers in Japan in 2011 (MOJ 
2012)
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them a tool to access Japanese culture. Most former Chinese students we interviewed spent one to two 
years in the language school and then advanced to vocational schools or universities. Starting from 
zero, many of them managed to pass Level One Japanese proficiency test after just one and a half years. 
After receiving several years of language and formal education, most of them were proficient in Japa-
nese. Also because of the pressure to pay for their living and future tuition, many of them started 
working at part time jobs immediately after landing in Japan (Liu-Farrer 2011a). Zeng Lan, a 32-year 
old Chinese woman, currently a real estate agent in a Japanese company, started to work immediately 
after entering Japan in 2002. From working for a Chinese restaurant when she couldnʼt speak Japanese 
at all, she gradually accumulated more Japanese skills and moved to part time jobs at Japanese restau-
rants. Later on, she discovered that working for convenient stores in residential areas allowed her to 
understand Japanese society and cultural practices much better. She spent most of her vocational 
school and university years working at diﬀerent convenient stores.
The spouses and dependents usually learn Japanese more informally. Some participated in local gov-
ernmentsʼ free Japanese language programs. Others gradually acquired conversational Japanese 
through daily interaction and watching Japanese TV.
Because immigrants enter schools, firms, and families directly after they land in Japan, most of them 
have to learn to adapt to the institutional environment. Their interactions with Japanese people are 
constant and their relationships with the Japanese society are direct, in the form of classmates, cowork-
ers, bosses and workers, husbands and wives, teachers and students. Through frequent socialization 
and through conflicts and compromises, many immigrants gain a very deep understanding of Japanese 
society. Adopting diﬀerent comparative frameworks, the Chinese, the Koreans and the Filipinos all 
demonstrate a good grasp of the work ethic, social rules and cultural practices of Japanese people.
Not only do they understand Japanʼs cultural practice and social rules, the new immigrants also 
practice them. In my field site at a Chinese language school, I notice that most parents do not speak 
Chinese with their children. Not only do women who marry to Japanese husbands use Japanese with 
their children exclusively, Chinese women who marry Chinese men also speak Japanese with their 
Table 3.　Gender distributions of Chinese, Koreans and Filipinos (MOJ 2012)
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children. To the degree almost none of the immigrant children at the Chinese language school speak 
Chinese. In the usual parent conversations, juken (entrance examination for getting into selective Japa-
nese junior high schools) and juku are the most common topics. Sometimes some mothers bring their 
infants and small children to the parent room. The music and the games they play were all typical Jap-
anese ones. Listening to the music, once a mother mentioned how nostalgic she was toward the early 
morning childrenʼs program on NHK.
The majority of the immigrants we interviewed experienced reverse cultural shocks or even physical 
discomfort when visiting the sending society. A Chinese young man explained that he felt really “out 
of touch with” Chinese society. He didnʼt know any of the words and culture among his old friends. A 
friend of his spent his first half year after returning China from Japan learning the new vocabulary and 
customs. Besides language, he also felt Chinese way of life became diﬃcult to accept.
In terms of lifestyle, I feel I am more adapted to the Japanese lifestyle. Even though it is tiring 
I feel my life (here) is full (chongshi). What I mean is, although work is very tiring, but (I) 
have vacations. If I go out shopping, I feel very comfortable. Japanese service is very devel-
oped. Also, everywhere you go, it is clean and orderly… it can make me relaxed. In China, 
when I go back, I have to be on guard of pick pockets. I canʼt go to the toilet when I go out. 
And, wherever you go, the air is foul (wuyanzhangqi). Really dirty, I feel. It is tiring to have a 
stroll in the street. … I feel that since I am living here, gradually I am following the Japanese 
way of thinking. If I go back, I have to learn from the beginning again.   
 (Interview, April 11, 2011)
Economic Roles: Niche in the Transnational Economy
Immigrantsʼ economic positions and roles also contribute to their perception of their relationship 
with Japan. Even though Japanese firms need foreign workers, they are not culturally and organiza-
tionally adapted to accommodate foreign employees. The rigid process oriented corporate practice 
(Ono 2007), gendered work patterns, the culture of hierarchy, and the inflexible promotion scheme 
make it very unattractive for foreign employees (Liu Farrer 2007, Oishi 2012). Moreover, immigrantsʼ 
niche in the corporate Japan is usually in the transnational and globalizing business. As I explained 
elsewhere, most Chinese turned employees were largely positioned in transnational businesses with 
China. They also see their own opportunity lying in Japanʼs globalizing sector (Liu-Farrer 2011a). 
Some of the former students and skilled migrants eventually become transnational entrepreneurs (Liu 
Farrer 2007). The Koreans have the similar trajectories. Many of them enter firms that have businesses 
with Koreans. Some enter Korean-owned multinational businesses. Because of the presence of a large 
number of old comers, some former students find work in Korean-run small firms right after language 
schools.
Few spouses, Chinese, Korean or Filipinos, participate in the labor market as full-time regular em-
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ployees. Many work on the part-time job market in factories and other service industry. Some others, 
however, try to utilize their foreign cultural capital and work as part-time language teachers, teaching 
Chinese, Koreans or English. Well-educated Filipino women in particular consider English language 
teaching their niche occupation. Some more entrepreneurial women also start ethnic business and 
even transnational business. In my sample, there are Korean women who run Korean esthetic salons. 
One Filipino woman goes to car auction business and runs a transnational business of used cars be-
tween Japan and the Philippines.
Between Permanent Residency and Citizenship
In this section, I describe the immigrantsʼ choice of permanent residency or naturalization, and ana-
lyze their rationales. In particular, I highlight their narratives about the association of citizenship with 
nationality, and how they present or deny such an association in justifying their own choices. I argue 
that both associating and disassociating these two concepts show that immigrants are strongly influ-
enced by the ethno-nationalist discourses that link their identity with nation-states.
Permanent residency over nationality
Newcomer immigrants have shown strong inclination to be long-term settlers in Japan. As Table 2 
shows, 27.4％ Chinese, 37.6％ Koreans and 47.6％ Filipinos held permanent resident status. According 
to Japanʼs Ministry of Justiceʼs Immigration and Control Act, the minimal residency requirement for 
applying for Permanent Residency in Japan is 10 years.9 According to Japanʼs Nationality Law, an im-
migrant is eligible for applying for nationality after 5 years of continuous residency. In a way, one can 
argue that, if immigrants are eager to secure their legal statuses in Japan, naturalization is more readily 
available than permanent residency. However, as shown in Table 1, immigrants in Japan have a much 
stronger tendency to obtain permanent residency than nationality, even though they have to wait an 
extra five years to be eligible. What my sample indicates is not too removed from the general reality. In 
2011, 33,351 immigrants obtained permanent residency in Japan while one third of that number 
(10,359) obtained nationality of Japan.10 This picture is also consistent with the trend among Chinese 
newcomers. In the recent decade, three times as many Chinese obtained permanent residency as those 
who were granted nationality (Liu-Farrer 2012).11
9 Ten years of residency is a normal condition for applicants. Spouses to Japanese nationals, foreigners with outstanding contri-
butions to Japan, and highly skilled migrants who have the required points according to the newly instituted point system 
might apply for permanent residency with fewer than 10 years of residency.
10 The success rate for naturalization is generally high in Japan. In 2011, 11,008 people applied, and 10,359 people were granted 
nationality. The success rate is 94％.
11 The calculation is more diﬃcult for the Koreans and the Filipinos. For the Koreans, the naturalization rate is higher (5,656) 
than those who obtained permanent residency (2,180). However, since the majority of Koreans in Japan are zainichi Koreans 
with Special permanent residency, only around 29 percent of Korean residents are newcomer Koreans who entered Japan 
since late 1970s. For the Filipino, the diﬃculty lies in that the Ministry of Justice does not have a separate category for Filipi-
nos who obtained nationality. They are lumped into the Other category.
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Permanent residency as a pragmatic choice
Except for several Korean immigrants who expressed no intention to stay in Japan for long, and felt 
there was no particular advantage associated with a Japanese permanent residency, most interviewees 
did not hesitate to apply for permanent residency when eligible. Those who havenʼt yet applied all ex-
pressed the intention to do so. As Chung (2010) describes, permanent residency in Japan gave immi-
grants access to practically all social services for Japanese citizens except voting rights.12 When in-
quired about their motivations to obtain permanent residency, they indeed oﬀered mostly pragmatic 
reasons.
What attract most immigrants to permanent residency are the security of being able to reside in Ja-
pan without worrying about visa, the access to bank loans, the freedom to live unhinged to particular 
institutions or to choose diﬀerent occupations. In fact, permanent residency is a goal which many im-
migrants struggle to achieve. As Meng, a 34 year old Chinese man explained,
In the future, (I am thinking), after all (in) the current job in the Japanese company, I feel that 
it is much harder for me to climb up than the Japanese. It needs a lot of eﬀort. So, if it is possi-
ble, I would like to have my own business, to have something to myself, even if just a little 
restaurant. Or, … mm… concrete plans, I donʼt have concrete plans yet. Because, it might 
have to do with my personality, I feel that (I) need to do it well what I have to do today. So, 
the first step, I think… because I have one more year to be eligible for permanent residency, 
so I am thinking, after this year, that is, when I get my permanent residency, then I will think 
about other stuﬀ, my career in the future.  
 (Interview, August 26, 2011)
Permanent residency triumphs over citizenship because immigrants have practical considerations 
about future. Many expressed reluctance to naturalize because they eventually wanted to go back to 
their home countries or go to a third country. For example, Ms. Kim, a 41-year old Korean woman 
with two children, obtained permanent residency but would not consider naturalization. Her family 
planned to go to Australia in three years so that their children could speak better English and become 
a real “international person”. Chen, a Chinese woman who married to a Japanese man, said,
I am almost 47. In three years I will be able to get my retirement pension in China. I was a 
kindergarten teacher for over a decade. Adding the years spent on education plus other work-
ing years, my pension money every month wonʼt be too shabby. Also, if I naturalize as a Japa-
nese national, it will be troublesome to go back to China. It is too much trouble for my hus-
band who has to leave the country every 6 months. So I am definitely not going to naturalize. 
12 Permanent residents are mostly prohibited from voting in local elections.
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I am okay with a permanent residency, and get a reentry every three years. It is convenient in 
both places.  
 (Interview, September 1, 2011)
Other immigrants weigh the relative advantage of permanent residency and citizenship and drew 
the conclusion that Japanese nationality was not so desirable, especially in light of the development of 
the home country. This is obvious among the Chinese and the Koreans whose home country econo-
mies were ascending relative to Japan. As the following conversation with a Chinese engineer shows,
Q: Your current status is permanent residency. Have you considered naturalization?  
A: No, I didnʼt. I think Chinese nationality is good. There is no need to naturalize. Japanese 
nationality doesnʼt have much advantage, except the voting rights and the not needing a visa 
to go abroad. But you canʼt guarantee that in 10 years Chinese still need visas (to go overseas). 
If you give up Chinese nationality, you canʼt get it back. If I wanted to naturalize, I could have 
done it 10 years ago.  
 (Interview, August 5, 2011)
Even among those who had no plan to return to home country and who confessed to be very accul-
turated in their daily life, there was a lack of interest in citizenship. As this Korean man describes,
If possible, (I) want to continue to live in Japan, live in the current environment. I am not 
considering returning to Korea. But, (I) donʼt see the necessity to naturalize. I do not particu-
larly like Korea or dislike Japan. Naturalization doesnʼt make it more convenient for me. 
Right now, I have permanent residency. Other than voting rights, I am treated the same as 
Japanese.  
 (Interview, September 23, 2012)
Nationality and Ethno-cultural identity
Most immigrants would not consider applying for Japanese citizenship because of a strong associa-
tion between nationality and ethno-cultural traits, and in Filipinosʼ case, also racial. As May, a Filipino 
woman who married to a Japanese man, explained,
I donʼt have the feeling that Iʼm an outsider (of Japanese society), although I still donʼt want to 
be a citizen. Although my husband has been telling me for a long time now to convert to Japa-
nese citizenship, Iʼm the one who doesnʼt want to. (Interviewer: Why donʼt you want to?) First 
of all, my color, my face, theyʼre very Filipina (chuckles). Is there any Japanese woman who 
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looks like this? And, secondly, Iʼm not an expert in kanji, I still find it diﬃcult to write in their 
language. There, thatʼs another reason… And… itʼs like, I couldnʼt adapt to their attitudes… 
(Interviewer: What is it exactly that you couldnʼt adapt?) Their being selfish… and their lack 
of belief in God. So maybe I do have a role here, to share with them… Although I donʼt really 
need to share with all the Japanese. The ones who… as much as possible, Iʼd like to share the 
words of God. Maybe thatʼs my role.  
 (Interview, March 14, 2012)
This association between ethno-cultural traits and nationality is also expressed among those who 
have become Japanese citizens or intended to naturalize. Naturalized people or those who have such 
intention tend to talk about the pragmatic reasons for naturalization. As Chris, a 38-year-old Filipino 
entrepreneur states,
Yeah, I see myself changing my nationality, possibly. Not like I wanna do it right now. I could 
feel that I am Filipino, but I think that nationality should be a choice. It shouldnʼt be like, im-
posed on you. I love being Filipino. There are a lot of things that make me proud, but being 
Japanese will give me better opportunities. If I want opportunities, then I should change my 
nationality. But without doing so, if I could have the same opportunity, I think if I became 
rich then I wouldnʼt have to change my nationality. The thing is, I wanna be more global. 
Then if I go global, my Japanese nationality will help me more than my Filipino nationality, if 
you know what I mean. If I have a Japanese passport and I speak English. I am Asian and 
Western, I think I will be successful in global business. I will have a Filipino body with Japa-
nese documentation. It will be a lot easier for me to achieve it.  
 (Interview, February 17, 2012)
Among all three national groups of immigrants we have interviewed, the Koreans had the strongest 
opinions against naturalization. One Korean woman believed that the only situation that made sense 
to naturalize was when somebody really wanted to marry a Japanese person and naturalization was a 
condition required by the Japanese family.
More Chinese in our sample naturalized. Yet, they tend to focus on the pragmatic reasons. The Chi-
nese would say that even if you obtained Japanese nationality you cannot become Japanese national, 
and by relinquishing your Chinese citizenship you became nobody. In fact, among both the Chinese 
and the Koreans, there is sometimes a disdain again those who have naturalized. Naturalization is con-
sidered a stigma, meaning selling out. Below is a story told by a 39-year-old Chinese woman, a perma-
nent resident.
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I heard… heard this story, that is… like, somebody was also naturalized, then he was going 
through the immigration when he went back to China. The immigration had windows for 
Chinese and windows for foreigners. He might have gone to the Chinese window holding a 
Japanese passport. The person said… no he couldnʼt do it there. He said, “but I am Chinese.” 
Then, the person at the window said, “Oh, you still know that you are Chinese?” Hahaha… 
(Interviewer: Being sneered at?) Yes, and then I felt, this (getting naturalized) would be criti-
cized (bei ren shuo).  
 (Interview, February 19, 2012)
Those who have naturalized tend to keep a low profile and often keep their Japanese citizenship a se-
cret. Once when I asked a group of Chinese people whether they had naturalized, those who didnʼt 
naturalize said proudly, “No, of course not, we are Chinese. Thatʼs it.” Those who had naturalized re-
mained quiet, and would not answer until I asked them individually and in a much lower voice. One 
person laughed and said, “Yes, I have betrayed my country (pan guo le).”
In summary, immigrants in Japan largely prefer permanent residency status to citizenship. Their 
choices are often packaged in the narratives of practicality. Permanent residency allows them enough 
legal freedom and social rights in Japan and for most immigrants they were enough. Except one Chi-
nese man who have lived in Japan continuously since mid-1980s who stated that to naturalize was to 
have a say in Japanʼs decision making process and to have the same political rights as other Japanese 
tax payers, political rights in Japan are not something immigrants mentioned. Similarly, to justify their 
choice of Japanese nationality over permanent residency, those who have been naturalized tend to give 
practical reasons, such as the convenience for business travel. Obtaining Japanese nationality is there-
fore framed as a pragmatic choice instead of an identity choice. In terms of identity, it is considered 
impossible for non-Japanese immigrants to truly become Japanese. Japanese is a certain category of 
people, as Chinese, Korean or Filipinos are certain categories of peoples. Being a Japanese, as being a 
Chinese, a Korean or a Filipino, is primordial, deeply rooted in oneʼs lineage.
Understanding Immigrantsʼ Political Indiﬀerence in Japan: A Discussion
As an important signal, a choice of permanent residency over citizenship shows an indiﬀerence of 
immigrants toward their own political rights in Japan. The choice of nationality, on the other hand, 
echoing Brettel (2006)ʼs observation among immigrants in the US, is largely a response to pragmatic 
concerns. There is an ostensible lack of interest in host polity among the new immigrants in Japan. Po-
litical participation in the host society is rarely mentioned. There are many reasons for such political 
indiﬀerence. In this section, I will discuss several themes that have been recurrent in immigrants nar-
ratives, albeit to diﬀerent degrees and sometime with diﬀerent contents among the immigrants of three 
national groups. I argue the immigrantsʼ political indiﬀerence has much to do with: first, their lack of a 
collective immigrant identity; second, their lack of a sense of belonging to Japan—an identification 
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with Japan; and finally, a transnational and sometimes even cosmopolitan outlook.
Cultural Assimilation and the Absence of a Collective Immigrant Identity
As pointed out previously, immigrants in Japan are very much acculturated. This has a lot to do with 
Japanʼs restrictive immigration regime. Immigrants enter Japan through particular institutional chan-
nels under the restrictive migration policies. Upon landing, immigrants are immediately thrown into 
the Japanese social world. Unlike in the US or Australia where immigrants can find a substantial eth-
nic community to ease such a transition, the immigrants in Japan have to confront the Japanese society 
directly. Their interaction with Japanese is direct, immediate and frequent, and the pressure for them 
to fit in is high. By the time they have gone through the educational institutions, find stable jobs, or 
settle in the Japanese families, they have to a large extent acquired the cultural competence in Japan.
However, despite the level of acculturation, what immigrants in Japan lack is a collective immigrant 
identity. Immigrants we have encountered generally reject using the label “immigrants” to identify 
themselves (Liu-Farrer 2011a), because they donʼt think Japan is an immigrant country, unlike the US 
or Australia. They consider themselves foreigners, trying to make a living in Japan which requires that 
they learn the cultural rules and fit in the existing Japanese society. The more culturally assimilated 
they are, the better they understand and accept the cultural logic of Japanese society. They have en-
countered institutional discrimination, especially when they look for housing or try to get promoted in 
Japanese companies. They donʼt approve some of the xenophobic practices persistent in Japanese. They 
complain as well, among themselves. Yet, they donʼt try to have a political movement to change it, be-
cause it is Japan. Japan is an island country and is not yet an immigrant Society. Most of them do not 
even entertain the idea of living in Japan for the rest of their life, despite their permanent residency 
and citizenship. Even when there is an emotional attachment and a sense of belonging, it is often a re-
sult of not having an alternative—the home society has become both socially and culturally unfamiliar.
The decision to settle in Japan and to naturalize does not translate into an active participation into 
their political process.
Having local belonging but not national belonging
Despite the fact that none of the immigrants consider Japan an immigrant country, quite a number 
of immigrants responded positively to our question whether they had a sense of belonging (guishugan) 
to Japanese society. Women marrying to Japanese men tend to show a clearer sense of belonging to the 
Japanese society. However, when they talk about their sense of belonging to Japan, what they really 
mean is a sense of fit in the local community. As a 40 year old Chinese woman, Jing Yu, answered to 
the question whether she had a sense of “belonging” in Japan,
Yes, in the neighbor hood I live in. Sometimes my neighbors forget that I am not a Japanese 
person when they are talking to me. I feel that I am already part of the Japanese society, com-
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pletely fit into it. For example, I will feel that I am returning to home when I come back from 
my visit to Shanghai.  
 (Interivew, September 16, 2011)
More often, though, immigrant men and women tie their sense of belonging to small groups or cir-
cles such as their families, workplaces, hobby groups, or co-ethnic professional circles. For the reli-
gious Filipinos and the Koreans, the church and the ethnic congregations are where they feel a true 
emotional connection with others. Those places are where they spend most of their leisure time. In 
comparison, for non-religious immigrants, especially the Chinese and some Koreans, families and 
children, if they have them, are the focus of their aﬀection and attention.
There are several narratives about a more abstract and nationalized belonging. One man, fond of 
Japanese service and life style, considered himself to possess a consumerʼs belonging to Japanese soci-
ety. Several men decided they were members of Japanese society because they were taxpayers, making 
economic contribution to the country. More often, though, national belonging is associated with their 
home country. It is another word for identity.
As manifested in the narratives about permanent residency and citizenship previously, immigrants 
invariantly essentialize their own identity as well as the Japanese identity. While the permanent resi-
dents avoid naturalization because of their strong association between national citizenship and nation-
al identity, the naturalized citizens try to decouple these two.
Moreover, immigrantsʼ narratives are full of stereotypes about themselves and the Japanese people. 
The warm Koreans and the cold Japanese; the rule-abiding and civilized Japanese and the unruly and 
rash Filipinos; the outcome oriented Chinese and the process-focused Japanese, and so on so forth…
The national discourse of Japaneseness that became part of the national narratives spread by the suc-
cessful Japanese businesses in the world (Kosaku 1992) had a particular strong influence on immi-
grantsʼ perception of the Japanese. Nihonjinron lends immigrants a discursive tool to frame their expe-
rience.
I argue that such ethnonationalism, and the nationalization of individual identity pose as unsurpass-
able barriers for immigrants to adopt the citizenship consciousness in the Japanese society. These na-
tionalistic narratives about both Japan and their home countries persistently remind immigrants of the 
divide between themselves and the host country, stopping immigrants from identifying with the host 
society. Such a strong notion of Chineseness, Koreanness, Filipinoness and Japaneseness reflects de-
cades of nation-building eﬀorts in all these countries. Particularly among the Chinese and the Kore-
ans, their national narrative is constructed on the misery of war and colonization by the Japanese. This 
reinforced narrative of historical antagonism has planted deep roots in immigrantsʼ mind. As a result, 
immigrants have no incentive to participate in their host polity.




Another important factor that causes immigrantsʼ political indiﬀerence toward Japanese society is 
both their transnational outlook and sometimes a cosmopolitan attitude. This transnationalism and 
cosmopolitanism has to do with both their economic roles in Japan and their self-perceived outsider 
position as “non-immigrant” foreign residents in Japan.
As I have shown in the section on immigrantsʼ economic incorporation, because of the booming 
economy between Japan and China and Korea, the Chinese and Korean immigrants tend to occupy 
niche in Japanʼs transnational economy with their home countries (see Liu-Farrer 2007, 2011a, 2011b 
for a more detailed description of Chinese immigrantsʼ transnational occupations and entrepreneur-
ship). The Filipinos are mostly part-time irregular workers. However, one entrepreneurial immigrant 
woman in our sample has been doing successful business in the transnational trading with the Philip-
pines. Most recently she was engaged in used car trading, buying cars at the car auction and selling 
them in the Philippines.
Their living arrangement and life course design also reflect a transnational outlook. Many of the 
Chinese have bought houses in China, and paid into social security and pension there. Some Koreans, 
after living in Japan for over a decade, hesitate to even apply for permanent residency in Japan. The Fil-
ipinos in Japan tend to shoulder the burden to support their often large family in the Philippines, 
sending their numerous nephews and nieces to school. Despite the fact that they do not go back to the 
Philippines often and do not even know whether they will go back eventually, they buy properties in 
the Philippines, and sometimes even join business initiatives in the Philippines.
A cosmopolitan attitude is also visible. After living in Japan for many years, because of the accultura-
tion and the fact that they have established their life world in Japan, some immigrants start to realize 
that going back home is no longer a viable choice. The Chinese and the Filipinos even express a sense 
of ontological insecurity when they talk about their home countries. However, they will always be for-
eigners living in Japan. They instead try to find a framework for their identity. As a Chinese woman 
entrepreneur states,
I donʼt think it is necessary for us to be blended into Japanese society. We canʼt be really 
blended into it, and neither do we want to. Chinese are Chinese. We have diﬀerent ways of 
life. We just participate in their society and work with them. Besides, the economy has be-
come global. …I am working in the global economy, not a particular Japanese one.  
 (Interview cited from Liu-Farrer, 2007)
Many Chinese and Korean migrants hope to send their children to North America for higher educa-
tion, hoping their children will eventually have a much wider playing field.
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The Limits of Multicultural Coexistence Programs
In order to fully utilize the human resources brought by the foreign migrants, to avoid cultural con-
flicts, and to better incorporate foreign residents into Japanese social life, starting from the 1990s 
through local governmentsʼ initiatives and later promoted in mid-2000s by Ministry of Internal Aﬀairs 
and Communications, multicultural coexistence policies and programs have become formally institut-
ed in most Japanese prefectures and cities.
Japanʼs multicultural coexistence programs rely on local governments to provide services to foreign-
ers residing in their locales and to incorporate them into local communities (Tagmeyer-Pak 2000, Kibe 
2011, Aiden 2011, Nagy 2014). Tabunka kyōsei is also a culturally oriented program (Kibe 2011). As 
the name tabunka kyōsei implies, it presents its central issue of coexistence of people from diﬀerent 
ethno-cultural background as cultural diﬀerence. In the 2006 ʻReport of the Working Group on Multi-
cultural Coexistence Promotionʼ (tabunka kyōsei no suishin ni kansuru kenkyūkai hōkokusho) pub-
lished by Ministry of Internal Aﬀairs and Communications (MIAC), tabunka kyōsei is defined as ʻpeo-
ple who diﬀer in nationality, ethnicity, and so on, recognizing one anotherʼs cultural diﬀerences, and 
living together as members of the local community, while trying to build a relationship based on 
equalityʼ (MIAC 2006: 5, quoted from Aiden 2011: 223). In the same month, the MIAC Local Admin-
istration Bureau sent a letter addressing all local governments, together with its ʻPlan for Multicultural 
Coexistence Promotion in Local Communitiesʼ (chiiki ni okeru tabunka kyōsei suishin puran), asking 
local governments to produce their own ʻguidelines and plans for the promotion of multicultural coex-
istence in keeping with the circumstances of the respective regionsʼ (Aiden 2011). In practice, local 
governmentsʼ programs mostly focus on removing linguistic barriers for the access to services and 
promoting appreciation for diﬀerent cultures. Many city or ward oﬃces provide multilingual services 
at ward/city oﬃces and oﬀer free or aﬀordable language lessons to foreign residents. The cultural divi-
sions of the ward oﬃces regularly organize international cultural events, providing residents from dif-
ferent national backgrounds opportunities to show case their cultures (Aiden 2011).
To what degree Japanʼs multicultural coexistence programs have had eﬀects on immigrantsʼ incorpo-
ration in Japan? The interviews reveal that immigrants, especially spouses to Japanese nationals and 
dependents—often wives of Chinese immigrants, do utilize services, especially language services, pro-
vided by the multicultural coexistence programs under the local governments. Quite a few immigrants 
participated in the cultural activities organized in these programs. When being asked whether she had 
any information about other foreign residents in the area, Ms. M, a 40-year old Chinese woman living 
in Saitama Prefecture, said,
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The newsletter has it. The newsletter issued by the city oﬃce has it. Every month, every city 
oﬃce will issue a newsletter to every household. In there, it says how many people of this na-
tionality or that are living in the city. Also, there are foreignersʼ cultural exchanges, interna-
tional exchanges. Residents of all nationalities go. Some cook Korean food, Chinese food. Or 
take with you, and have a potluck. And then you do some performances. There are activities 
like that. (Interviewer: Have you participated?) (I) participated a lot before. I often took some 
food there. Wrapped some dumplings and went. (To the interviewer:) You can participate in 
those activities too. There are a lot of them. You can go and ask your city oﬃce when will be 
the next exchange. You can ask them, and then participate in it. It is really good.  
 (Interview, May 4, 2011)
This is about the extent immigrants feel the influence of multicultural coexistence programs. They 
do appreciate such activities, and they make them feel welcome and do generally enhance their appre-
ciation of Japanese society. Yet, it is obvious that in those cultural programs, they are still treated as 
foreigners and cultural representatives of their own countries. Such programs might foster a sense of 
local belonging. However, to what degree such a local cultural program instills in immigrants a politi-
cal will to ask for institutional reforms is uncertain.
Conclusion
This paper tries to understand newcomer immigrantsʼ lack of political interests and participation in 
the Japanese society. As a focal phenomenon, I describe their choices of permanent residency or citi-
zenship in Japan and their narratives around such choices. I argue that their reasoning for both choos-
ing permanent residency and citizenship shows their instrumental concerns and a disinterest from 
host polity. I argue that such political indiﬀerence has to do with many factors. Among them, the eth-
no-nationalistic narratives about Japan and their home countries play an important framing role. Be-
cause the national identity is essentialized for both the Japanese and the immigrants, it becomes im-
mutable, making it cognitively impossible for them to become Japanese. Despite their local belonging, 
immigrants cannot cultivate in themselves a sense of national belonging—that they belong to Japan 
the nation. Moreover, the persistent perception of Japan as a non-immigrant country prevents immi-
grants from establishing a collective immigrant identity. The absence of both a national belonging and 
an immigrant identity potentially deprive immigrants of both the interest to participate in the national 
politics and the will to organize social movements. Local cultural programs and general civility of Jap-
anese society have helped to alleviate the possibility of acute and widespread conflicts.
Second, because of the restrictive migration channels, the immigrants in Japan tend to come in 
through established channels and enter Japanʼs formal institutions. There is a lot of pressure for them 
to fit into Japanese society, be it school, workplace or family. As a result, they make a great eﬀort in ac-
quiring Japanese language and cultural skills, and trying to understand and follow the Japanese way of 
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life. To a large extent, they are culturally assimilated into Japanese society. Such assimilation makes 
them prioritize the Japanese perspectives, and tend to naturalize institutional discrimination against 
foreigners. In the extreme case, as I presented at the very beginning of the paper, immigrants buy into 
the notion that “When Japanese people are getting better oﬀ, foreigners will get better oﬀ too.”
Finally, their economic location in Japan is either on the secondary labor market or on the emerging 
labor market that has to do with the transnational economy with their home countries. This kind of 
economic role aﬀects their perception of their position in the society and their understanding of their 
relationship with it. As a consequence, they acquire what Vertovec (2004) terms “bifocality”. When de-
signing their career and life, they constantly refer to both host society and home society, weighing op-
tions and making choices. This, again, leads to a pragmatic attitude toward citizenship.
References
Aiden, H. S. (2011). Creating the ʻmulticultural coexistenceʼ society: central and local government policies towards foreign residents 
in Japan. Social Science Japan Journal 14(2), 213‒231.
Asakawa, Akihiro （浅川晃広）. （2003）．Foreigners in Japan and Naturalization Institution （在日外国人と帰化制度）． Tokyo: Shin-
kansha （新幹社）.
Bauböck, R. (1995). Transnational citizenship: Membership and rights in international migration. Aldershot: Elgar.
Brettel, Carolina B. (2006) Political belonging and cultural belonging: Immigration status, citizenship, and identity among four im-
migrant populations in a Southwestern City. In American Behavioral Scientist 50(1): 70‒99.
Castle Stephen and Alastair Davidson (2000). Citizenship and migration: Globalization and the politics of belonging. Routledge.
Cho, W. and K. Tam (1999). Naturalization, socialization, participation: Immigrants and (non-) voting. The Journal of Politics, 
61(04), 1140‒1155.
Chung, Erin Aeran (2010). Immigration and citizenship in Japan. Cambridge University Press.
Davidson, A. (1997). From subject to citizen: Australian citizenship in the Twentieth Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.
Douglass, M. (2000). The singularities of international migration of women to Japan. Japan and Global Migration: Foreign Workers 
and the Advent of a Multicultural Society. London: Routledge. 91‒119.
Folk, R. (1993). The making of global citizenship. Global Visions: Beyond the New World Order, 39.
Gilbertson, Greta, and Audrey Singer (2003). The emergence of protective citizenship in the USA: Naturalization among Domini-
can immigrants in the post-1996 welfare reform era, Ethnic and Racial Studies 26(1): 25‒51.
Gordon, M. M. (1964). Assimilation in American life: The role of race, religion and national origins. Oxford University Press.
Ip, David, Christine Inglis, and Tong-Wu. C. (1997). Concepts of citizenship and identity among recent Asian immigrants in Aus-
tralia. Asian and Pacific Migration Journal 6 (1997): 363‒384.
Kawamura, Noriko, Yoichiro Murakami and Shin Chiba (2011). Building new pathways to peace. Washington University Press.
Kibe, Takashi (2011). “Immigration and integration policies in Japan: At the crossroads of the welfare state and the labor market.” 
Gabriele Vogt and Glenda Roberts (eds.) Migration and integration—Japan in comparative perspective. IUDICIUM Verlag 
GmbH.
Lien, Pei-te (2004). Asian Americans and voting participation: Comparing racial and ethnic diﬀerences in recent US elections. Inter-
national Migration Review 38(2): 493‒517.
Liu-Farer, Gracia (2007). “Producing Global economies from below: Chinese immigrant transnational entrepreneurship in Japan,” 
In Saskia Sassen (ed.) Deciphering the global: Its spaces, scales, and subjects. New York: Routledge. 177‒198.
Liu-Farrer, Gracia (2012). “Becoming New Overseas Chinese: Transnational Practices and Identity Construction among the Chinese 
Migrants in Japan,” In Plüss, Caroline and Chan Kwok-bun (eds.) Living intersections: Transnational migrant identifications in 
asia, Dordrecht, NL: Springer, pp. 150‒167.
Liu-Farrer, Gracia (2011a). Labor migration from China to Japan: International students, transnational migrants. London: Routledge.
Liu-Farrer, Gracia (2011b). Making careers in the occupational niche: Chinese students in corporate japanʼs transnational business. 
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 37(6).
Logan, J., J. Darrah, and S. Oh (2012). The impact of race and ethnicity, immigration and political context on participation in Amer-
?     ?
Gracia Liu-Farrer
144
ican electoral politics. Social Forces 90(3): 993‒1022.
Marshall, T. H. (1950). Citizenship and social class.  Cambridge. Vol. 11, pp. 28‒29.
Nagy, S. R. (2014). Politics of multiculturalism in East Asia: Reinterpreting multiculturalism. Ethnicities 14(1): 160‒176.
Oishi, N. (2005). Women in motion: Globalization, state policies, and labor migration in Asia. Stanford University Press.
Pak, K. T. (2000). Foreigners are local citizens, too: Local governments respond to international migration in Japan. Japan and Glob-
al Migration: Foreign Workers and the Advent of a Multicultural Society, 243‒74.
Shipper, Appichai (2008). Fighting for foreigners: Immigration and its impact on Japanese democracy. Cornell University Press.
Soysal, Yesemin Nuhoglu (2000). Citizenship and identity: Living in diasporas in post-war Europe? Ethnic and Racial Studies 23(1): 
1‒15.
Soysal,Yasemin Nuhoglu (1994). The limits of citizenship: Migrants and postnational membership in Europe. University of Chicago 
Press.
Turner, B. S. (1990). Outline of a theory of citizenship. Sociology 24(2): 189‒217.
Vertovec, Steven (2004). Migrant transnationalism and modes of transformation. International Migration Review 38(3): 970‒1001.
Yoshino, Kosaku (1992). Cultural nationalism in contemporary Japan: A sociological inquiry. Routledge.
